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THE COURT AS GATEKEEPER:  
PREVENTING UNRELIABLE PRETRIAL 
EDISCOVERY FROM JEOPARDIZING A 
RELIABLE FACT-FINDING PROCESS 
Daniel K. Gelb* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several years, a significant legal debate has evolved over 
whether the predicates outlined in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and 
interpreted by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 should be 
applied to adjudicating issues relating to technology-assisted review 
(TAR).2  The proliferation of electronic evidence and discovery 
(eDiscovery)—and the massive volumes of electronically stored 
information (ESI) associated with eDiscovery—require that practitioners 
understand how the pretrial review of ESI impacts its admissibility at trial. 
As discussed more fully below, until a procedural scheme is codified by 
statute for the application of TAR and other related methodologies to 
 
*  Daniel K. Gelb is a partner at the law firm of Gelb & Gelb LLP in Boston, Massachusetts 
(www.gelbgelb.com) where he represents clients in general and white collar criminal 
defense matters, complex civil litigation, arbitration, regulatory proceedings, and academic 
disciplinary hearings.  Prior to joining Gelb & Gelb LLP, Mr. Gelb was an Assistant District 
Attorney with the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office in Massachusetts.  He is rated 
“AV” by Martindale Hubbell Law Directory and is listed in New England Super Lawyers 
and Massachusetts Super Lawyers.   Mr. Gelb has been elected to be a fellow of the 
Litigation Counsel of America and as a member of The National Trial Lawyers:  Top 100 
Trial Lawyers.  He is a frequent speaker and author on criminal and civil trial practice and 
procedure, including electronic evidence and discovery.  Mr. Gelb is a contributing author of 
MCLE, Inc.’s Ethical Lawyering in Massachusetts, Massachusetts Superior Court Civil 
Practice Manual, and has been published by various media outlets including 
Bloomberg BNA, Corporate Counsel Magazine, The Champion Magazine, ABA’s Criminal 
Justice Magazine, and The New York Times in the “Room for Debate” section of the 
newspaper’s website.  Mr. Gelb is a member of The Sedona Conference® Working Group on 
Electronic Document Retention & Production, the Advisory Board for Bloomberg BNA’s 
White Collar Crime Report, and is a member of the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers’ (“NACDL”) White Collar Crime Committee, as well as NACDL’s Amicus 
Committee for which Mr. Gelb is the Vice Chair for the First Circuit. 
 
 1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2. See David J. Waxse & Brenda Yoakum-Kriz, Experts on Computer-Assisted Review:  
Why Federal Rule of Evidence 702 Should Apply to Their Use, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 207 
(2013); see also Andrew Peck, Search, Forward; Will Manual Document Review and 
Keyword Searches Be Replaced by Computer-Assisted Coding?, L. TECH. NEWS (Oct. 2011), 
available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1451491.files//Panel_1-Background 
_Paper.pdf. 
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eDiscovery review, litigants in both civil and criminal proceedings should 
be entitled to challenge whether an opponent has met the qualifying 
threshold of Rule 702.  The integrity of the methodology for ESI review 
during the discovery phase will unquestionably impact the admissibility of 
the substantive evidence at trial.  Therefore, the need for—and timing of—a 
Rule 702–type analysis for eDiscovery review must be reconciled with the 
current scheme to ensure judicial economy and procedural due process at 
trial for both civil and criminal litigants. 
I.   HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF RULE 702 AND ITS APPLICATION 
Originally, Rule 702 was intended to address the admissibility of expert 
trial testimony.3  The evolution of ESI, however, has created an inextricable 
tie between the evidence developed during the discovery phase of litigation 
and the admissibility of that evidence at the trial phase of the case.4  
Notably, Daubert’s applicability to Rule 702 is not procedurally ripe at the 
eDiscovery review phase of litigation because, unlike at trial, the fact-finder 
during discovery has yet to be presented with an evidentiary question upon 
which to make a finding with the assistance of expert testimony.5 
The Preliminary Draft of Rule 702 surfaced in 1969.6  The statutory 
history of Rule 702 is not controversial and, with the exception of the added 
terminology “in the form of an opinion or otherwise,” the text of the 
Preliminary Draft mirrors the ultimately codified content.7  When analyzing 
the promulgation of Rule 702, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 
noted that “[w]hether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert 
testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier [of fact].”8 
In 1991, an amendment was proposed by the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, the “avowed purposes” of which were to “limit the 
admissibility of scientific evidence and to coordinate the rule concerning 
admissibility of such evidence with the rules concerning its discovery.”9  
Soon thereafter, in 1992, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules referred 
 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 1979) (“One purpose of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence was to make opinion evidence admissible if it would be of 
assistance to the trier of fact.”). 
 4. See Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1163, 1236 (2014). 
 5. See Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted 
sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279(ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 1446534 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012). 
 6. See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 6261, at 170 & nn.1–2 (1997) (citing Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of 
Evidence for the U.S. District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 314 (1969)).  Wright 
and Gold describe how the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 7-02 in the Preliminary 
Draft differed in two ways from the Advisory Committee’s Note that presently follows Rule 
702.  First, the last paragraph of the Advisory Committee’s Note to the 1972 Proposed Rules, 
beginning with “[t]he rule is broadly phrased,” was not part of the Preliminary Draft. Id. 
§ 6261, at 170 n.1.  Second, the Advisory Committee’s Note in the Preliminary Draft 
included a paragraph that was ultimately excluded from the text of the Note. Id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 9. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 6, § 6261, at 171. 
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its proposed amendment to Rule 702 to the then-new Advisory Committee 
on Evidence Rules.10  In 1993, the Advisory Committee’s task of reviewing 
the Civil Rules Committee’s proposed amendment to Rule 702 was 
“preempted by the Supreme Court” in Daubert.11 
The advent of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Daubert provided trial 
courts across the country with a framework on how Rule 702 limits the 
admissibility of scientific evidence.  Thereafter, the Advisory Committee on 
Evidence Rules did not provide public notice of subsequent activity 
surrounding the 1992 proposed amendment.12 
In 2011, the language of Rule 702 was amended “as part of the restyling 
of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules.”13  The changes were 
intended to be “stylistic only” without altering “any result in any ruling on 
evidence admissibility.”14 
Historically, expert witness testimony has been a facet of trial practice 
relegated to informing the fact-finder.15  In Daubert, the Supreme Court 
ultimately decided to grant certiorari “in light of sharp divisions among the 
courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert 
testimony.”16  According to Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the petition 
for certiorari presented two questions:  first, whether the rule of Frye v. 
United States17 should remain “good law after the enactment of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence,” and second, if Frye remained good law, whether 
“expert scientific testimony” must be subject to a “peer review process” to 
be admissible.18 
 
 10. See id. § 6261, at 173 n.10 (citing Supreme Court of the U.S., Amendments to 
Federal Rules of Evidence, Excerpt from the Report of the Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, 147 F.R.D. 275, 282 (1993)). 
 11. See id. § 6261, at 173. 
 12. See id.  Wright and Gold note that a proposal to amend Rule 702 was introduced in 
Congress in 1995. Id. § 6261, at 173 n.13 (citing Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 
988, 104th Cong. § 3). 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 14. Id. 
 15. In its note to the 1972 Proposed Rules considering the promulgation of Rule 702,  
the Advisory Committee quoted Mason Ladd:   
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the 
common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to 
determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without 
enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject 
involved in the dispute. 
Id. (quoting Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952)). 
 16. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).  To demonstrate the 
split among circuits over the evidentiary standards concerning expert witness testimony, the 
Daubert Court compared United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59–60 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 
which applied the “general acceptance” standard, and DeLuca v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990), which rejected the “general 
acceptance” standard. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585. 
 17. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 18. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Computer-assisted review is inherently based on various scientific 
disciplines, including statistical analysis.19  Since the Supreme Court has 
positioned the trial judge as the “gatekeeper” of expert testimony,20 courts 
have the authority to determine whether expert testimony is truly based on 
“scientific knowledge,”21 which, in conjunction with Rule 702’s other 
factors, ultimately determines the admissibility of the testimony.  It would 
seem logical to employ a Rule 702–type approach to TAR and other aspects 
of ESI review where the validation of the results may become of 
consequence to the fact-finder (e.g., pattern of conduct, intentional 
practices, motive, etc.). 
As technology continues to weave itself into most—if not all—complex 
litigation, many evidentiary rulings are likely to be impacted by the 
underlying integrity of the discovery methodologies employed by the 
parties before trial. The complex nature of big-data litigation may arguably 
influence a trial court’s decision making vis-à-vis pretrial discovery; 
however, Supreme Court precedent on the standard of review has not 
changed.22  That being said, if Daubert and Rule 702 are relegated to the 
fact-finding process and held inapplicable to the reliability of discovery 
methods, what procedural tool can litigants assert when the standard of 
review places deference on evidentiary rulings made by the trial court? 
The gatekeeping function under Daubert is particularly pertinent to the 
issue of whether Rule 702 should apply to litigating the application of TAR 
methodologies, such as predictive coding, to complex eDiscovery.23  Expert 
testimony is not a jury question and is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 
104(a); that is, a court must rule on any preliminary question of 
qualification, privilege, or admissibility—on making such determinations, 
rules of evidence only apply to questions of privilege.24  The burden rests 
with the litigant proffering the expert evidence and is governed by the 
“preponderance of proof” standard.25  However, differences of opinion are 
 
 19. See United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 20. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (majority opinion) (“We recognize that, in practice, a 
gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent 
the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.  That, nevertheless, is the 
balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic 
understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.”). 
 21. Id. at 590 (emphasis added). 
 22. See Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (appellate courts reviewing a 
Daubert determination must apply an abuse of discretion standard). 
 23. See, e.g., Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted 
sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 1446534 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012) (holding Rule 702 inapplicable to discovery challenges). 
 24. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93 (“Faced with a proffer of expert scientific 
testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), 
whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the 
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.  This entails a preliminary assessment 
of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and 
of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 25. See id. at 592 & n.10 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 104(a)); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 
U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987). 
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emerging over whether the application of Rules 104 and 702 to TAR is 
appropriate given that the gatekeeping analysis traditionally has arisen 
during the in limine phase prior to trial and not as a matter of discovery.26  
Notably, the Supreme Court has “use[d] the term in a broad sense to refer to 
any motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated 
prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.”27 
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,28 the Supreme Court noted that 
 Rules 702–705 permit experts to testify in the form of an opinion, and 
without any exclusion of opinions on “ultimate issues.”  And Rule 701 
permits even a lay witness to testify in the form of opinions or inferences 
drawn from her observations when testimony in that form will be helpful 
to the trier of fact.29 
In its gatekeeping analysis, a court must consider whether the expert will 
“assist the trier of fact,”30 which is an issue to be determined by the trial 
judge.31  The trial court must then find that the expert testimony is “relevant 
to the task at hand” and that it rests “on a reliable foundation.”32  However, 
conclusions drawn from scientific knowledge must be based on legitimately 
sound scientific methodology, and not a test or standard of general 
acceptance.33 
Taking the above into consideration, Rule 702 sets forth the following 
factors concerning the admissibility of expert witness testimony: 
 A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise if:  (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
 
 26. Compare Moore, 287 F.R.D. at 188–89 (noting that Rule 702 concerns the 
admissibility of evidence at trial and finding that “Rule 702 and Daubert simply are not 
applicable to how [electronic] documents are searched for and found in discovery”), with 
Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331, 333 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[D]etermining 
whether a particular search methodology, such as keywords, will or will not be effective 
certainly requires knowledge beyond the ken of a lay person (and a lay lawyer) and requires 
expert testimony that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.”). 
 27. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984) (referencing the definition of 
“in limine” as “[o]n or at the threshold; at the very beginning; preliminarily” (quoting 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979)). 
 28. 488 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 29. Id. at 169. 
 30. FED. R. EVID. 702; supra note 24; see also 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 6, § 6266, 
at 263 & n.1 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595–96, for the proposition that questions related 
to an expert’s credibility are matters for the jury). 
 31. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 32. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.   
“Relevant evidence” is defined as that which has “any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  The Rule’s basic 
standard of relevance thus is a liberal one.  
Id. at 587 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401). 
 33. See id. at 589–93; see also id. at 588 (“The drafting history makes no mention of 
Frye, and a rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ 
of the Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 
“opinion” testimony.’” (quoting Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 169)). 
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knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or 
data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 
facts of the case.34 
When Rule 702 was originally enacted in 1975, its application to 
eDiscovery review methodologies, understandably, was not contemplated.35  
However, there are numerous instances in litigation where the reliability of 
the discovery process can sculpt the direction of evidence in a case.36  The 
review process applied to large volumes of ESI potentially could impact 
findings on dispositive motion practice as well as at trial.37  Therefore, an 
eDiscovery review methodology arguably can impact a litigant’s access to 
the most reliable evidence supporting a given claim or defense.38 
Therefore, the following observation of the Advisory Committee Notes 
may also be applied to search, retrieval, and review analysis of eDiscovery 
if the process is relevant to the evidence borne from it at trial:  “An 
intelligent evaluation of facts is often difficult or impossible without the 
application of some scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. 
The most common source of this knowledge is the expert witness, although 
there are other techniques for supplying it.”39  
As the forms of ESI become more varied and pervasive, so do the 
discovery disputes attendant to them.  The traditional procedural paradigm 
for pretrial discovery has evolved since the rules governing ESI took effect 
in 2006.40  However, although the rules of procedure have evolved, there is 
no mechanism to challenge the methodology to ensure quality assurance of 
the review process.  This places parties between the rocks and the whirlpool 
when the review process of electronically stored information could 
adversely impact the evidence ultimately presented at trial because it may 
be viewed as a discovery issue rather and an evidentiary question.41 
 
 34. See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 35. See Federal Rules of Evidence, 93 Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
 36. See Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence, supra note 4, at 1237. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 260 n.10 (D. 
Md. 2008) (“[C]hallenges to the sufficiency of keyword search methodology unavoidably 
involve scientific [and] technical . . . subjects . . . .”); Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, 248 
F.R.D. 331, 333 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (“When a case involves discovery 
of electronically stored information, the issues to be addressed during the Rule 26(f) 
conference depend on the nature and extent of the contemplated discovery and of the parties’ 
information systems.  It may be important for the parties to discuss those systems, and 
accordingly important for counsel to become familiar with those systems before the 
conference.  With that information, the parties can develop a discovery plan that takes into 
account the capabilities of their computer systems.  In appropriate cases identification of, 
and early discovery from, individuals with special knowledge of a party’s computer systems 
may be helpful.”). 
 41. See Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence, supra note 4, at 1238. 
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II.   AS BIG DATA GETS BIGGER, PRETRIAL RULINGS 
ON EDISCOVERY REVIEW WILL UNDOUBTEDLY IMPACT 
THE INTEGRITY OF TRIAL EVIDENCE 
Practice Point 7 from the Sedona Conference’s Best Practices 
Commentary on search and information retrieval provides that “[p]arties 
should expect that their choice of search methodology will need to be 
explained, either formally or informally, in subsequent legal contexts 
(including in depositions, evidentiary proceedings, and trials).”42 
Today’s bench and bar must recognize the reality that the evolution of 
large-scale eDiscovery has created a tectonic shift in the topography of 
modern complex litigation.  Federal Rule of Evidence 502 is a perfect 
example of how large-volume eDiscovery has earned a designation of 
exclusivity, in terms of the collateral risks associated with production and 
privilege review.43  The evolution of Rule 502 arguably demonstrates an 
overarching theme that the gap between the discovery and trial phases is 
narrowing as the volume of ESI review increases.  Arguably, the timing of 
when Rule 702 should be applied to review methodology should not differ 
from the timing of when a Rule 502 motion may be raised.  Even if Rule 
702 is considered a “trial” rule—and not a “discovery” rule—no specific 
reason could arguably surface from a court not to address a preliminary 
question prior to trial on the evidentiary impact ESI review methodology 
may have if challenged.44  If the resulting discovery is subsequently offered 
as evidence at trial, the process by which the ESI was discovered may raise 
the issue of witness qualification and, therefore, whether the evidence 
derived from the review is admissible.  Moreover, review methodology may 
raise questions of statutory privilege, which must be ruled upon by the court 
prior to reaching the fact-finder.45  Federal Rule of Evidence 502 enables a 
federal court to enter an order allowing a litigant to prospectively assert a 
privilege,46 rescind an inadvertent waiver resulting from production of 
discovery (“claw back”), and/or grant an opposing party limited access to a 
universe of discovery without relinquishing the ability to revoke it (“quick 
 
 42. See Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and 
Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 212 (2007) 
[hereinafter Sedona Conference Best Practices]. 
 43. See FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 44. See Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., Inc., 972 F.2d 304, 308 (10th Cir. 1992) (“In 
accordance with our holding in Head v. Lithonia Corp., Inc., 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989), 
the District Court had an independent duty here to decide whether the single data point 
supported the admissibility of the conclusions plaintiffs’ experts sought to draw therefrom.  
In so doing, the Court was required by [Rule 104(a)] to make a preliminary determination 
concerning the qualifications of the plaintiffs’ proposed witnesses and the admissibility of 
their testimony.  This requirement applies also to experts, since pursuant to [Rule 703], the 
District Court has the responsibility of evaluating the trustworthiness of the factual basis 
upon which an expert witness relies and assessing ‘whether the particular underlying data 
was of a kind that is reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field in reaching 
conclusions . . . .’” (quoting WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 703[03], at 703–16 (1982))). 
 45. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 46. See id. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (“Confidentiality orders are becoming 
increasingly important in limiting the costs of privilege review and retention, especially in 
cases involving electronic discovery.”). 
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peek”).47  Similar to Rule 502, the language of Rule 702 does not relegate a 
court to the “trial” phase prior to addressing questions of prospective 
admissibility of evidence.48 
As indicated in the aforementioned comparison to the timing of a court’s 
application of Rules 502 and 702, an argument against applying Daubert’s 
gatekeeping function to search and review methodologies, like TAR (e.g., 
predictive coding), is premised on the concept that Rule 702 applies to trial 
evidence and not pretrial discovery.49  However, pretrial rulings in cases 
such as In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Products Liability Litigation50 and 
Global Aerospace Inc. v. Landow Aviation, L.P.51 address predictive coding 
and how statistical analytical disciplines are applied to discovery review.52 
If parties are unable to seek judicial intervention at the onset of a high-
risk discovery dispute, then litigants must risk proceeding with a review 
process that may ultimately frustrate the goal of “secur[ing] the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”53 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 empowers a court to prospectively protect 
against waiver of privilege, and therefore, one can argue that the spirit of 
the rule and its application to the discovery phase is inapposite to a Daubert 
application to TAR under Rule 702.  However, Rule 502 is a vehicle to 
enter an evidentiary order that impacts the manner in which privilege will 
be protected during the discovery phase of litigation—a process in which a 
court is able to partake during the discovery phase under Rule 502(d).  Rule 
502 exemplifies the system’s recognition of the inextricable tie between the 
discovery phase of litigation and the domino effect that discovery rulings 
can have on future proceedings.54 
III.   THE DEBATE OVER WHETHER RULE 702 SHOULD APPLY 
TO LITIGATING EDISCOVERY METHODOLOGIES 
The evolving debate over whether Rule 702 should apply to litigation 
relating to eDiscovery search and review methodologies (e.g., TAR, 
keyword searching, etc.) supports the argument that the admissibility of ESI 
 
 47. See id. (“[T]he rule contemplates enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and ‘quick peek’ 
arrangements as a way to avoid the excessive costs of pre-production review for privilege 
and work product.”); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446 (4th ed. 2004) 
(noting that fear of the consequences of waiver “may add cost and delay to the discovery 
process for all parties” and that courts have responded by encouraging counsel “to stipulate 
at the outset of discovery to a ‘nonwaiver’ agreement, which they can adopt as a case-
management order.”). 
 48. See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 49. See Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 190–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted 
sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 1446534 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012). 
 50. No. 6:11-md-2299, 2012 WL 7861249 (W.D. La. July 27, 2012). 
 51. No. CL 61040, 2012 WL 1431215 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012). 
 52. See Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence, supra note 4, at 1237; see 
also In re Actos, 2012 WL 7861249, at *4. 
 53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 54. See Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence, supra note 4, at 1240. 
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is far more dependent on the underlying integrity of the pretrial discovery 
phase than other forms of more “traditional” evidence.55 
Today’s complex litigation presents an inextricable link between 
eDiscovery and the underlying integrity of the evidence presented at trial.56  
Litigation over TAR and related eDiscovery search and review 
methodologies should be subject to Rule 702 and the common law 
“gatekeeping” analysis.57  Notably, Federal Rule of Evidence 102 states 
“[t]hese rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding 
fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the 
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and 
securing a just determination.”58 
The types and volume of ESI differ across litigations—both civil and 
criminal—and in many instances, the stakes for litigants are too high not to 
qualify the certain eDiscovery review methodologies consistent with Rule 
702.  This is particularly the case to ensure the discovery at issue is 
representative of the anticipated trial evidence.59 
In Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.,60 the court stated that “the 
party selecting the methodology must be prepared to explain the rationale 
for the method chosen to the court, demonstrate that it is appropriate for the 
task, and show that it was properly implemented.”61  In Equity Analytics, 
LLC v. Lundin,62 the court held that determining whether particular search 
methodologies, such as keywords, “will or will not be effective certainly 
requires knowledge beyond the ken of a lay person (and a lay lawyer) and 
requires expert testimony that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.”63 
As Moore illustrates, the gatekeeping function delineated in Daubert is 
not operative unless the fact-finder will be presented with a question 
regarding evidentiary admissibility.64  As a practical matter, however, this 
 
 55. See supra note 38. 
 56. See United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008); see also 
Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence, supra note 4, at 1236. 
 57. See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 260–61 n.10 (D. 
Md. 2008) (“The goal of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is to set standards to determine 
whether information is ‘helpful’ to those who must make factual determinations involving 
disputed areas of science, technology or other specialized information.  The rule is one of 
common sense, and reason-opinions regarding specialized, scientific or technical matters are 
not ‘helpful’ unless someone with proper qualifications and adequate supporting facts 
provided such an opinion after following reliable methodology.  That these common sense 
criteria are found in the rules of evidence does not render them off-limits for consideration 
during discovery.  It is not unusual for pretrial factual determinations in civil cases to look to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence for assistance in resolving fact disputes.”). 
 58. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 59. See O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (“[C]ontention must be based on evidence that 
meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
 60. 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008). 
 61. Id. at 262. 
 62. 248 F.R.D. 331 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 63. Id. at 333. 
 64. See Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted 
sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 1446534 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012). 
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approach is problematic.  Understandably, when the rules of court were 
initially promulgated, they did not contemplate the influence pretrial 
discovery rulings could have on the evidence ultimately presented at trial.  
If technological concepts like TAR may require expert testimony, no 
present rule procedural mechanism available under the rules pertaining to 
discovery is available to challenge the validity of a disputed review process. 
If Daubert and Rule 702 are not at a court’s disposal at the discovery 
phase, the equitable hands of the judicial process become tied by relegating 
the “reliability” test to trial.  Litigants should not be required to remain 
silent during the review phase of eDiscovery if a legitimate challenge to the 
process concerns the underlying integrity of the evidence that will 
ultimately reach the jury (or trial judge).  Large data discovery review has 
only increased the need for the court to invoke—when moved—its 
gatekeeping function earlier in the litigation process.  Failing to do so could 
result in a misunderstanding by the fact finder of the evidentiary 
significance of the information derived from the eDiscovery review process. 
Restricting Rule 702 for addressing eDiscovery review on an in limine basis 
could confuse the issues to be adjudicated at a late stage of litigation.  
Waiting until trial before utilizing Rule 702 to address whether the results 
of a review process are technologically—or scientifically—reliable 
arguably places the evidentiary integrity underlying the fact-finding process 
at risk.65 
The judicial process accepts the use of TAR because it can be more cost 
effective than manual review, and if handled properly, can be a more 
reliable alternative to manual review.  Ironically, one can only endorse TAR 
as a reliable mechanism for large volume discovery review once 
determining that the results are statistically significant, a process which 
must adhere to scientifically reliable processes.66  No matter how one 
perceives the role of the gatekeeping function, it is apparent that it is being 
invoked—however subtly—when ESI review is otherwise impractical 
without it.67 
However, TAR, if not implemented and tested properly, risks false and/or 
incomplete results that could compromise a litigant’s claims or defenses at 
trial.  The manner in which eDiscovery is handled can impact a variety of 
matters:  The patterns or quantity of particular types of relevant documents 
produced; a litigant’s ability to support or impeach a claim of patterned 
conduct; and direct or circumstantial evidence of intent, negligence, and 
other claims where knowledge, notice, and chain of custody are at the heart 
 
 65. Challenges to expert evidence are not merely issues of evidentiary weight for the 
jury to determine.  A litigant, therefore, may challenge the application of a process that 
yields certain results, which bear on the integrity of the evidence before the fact finder. See 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993). 
 66. See supra notes 38, 59. 
 67. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (noting that gatekeeping 
function espoused in Daubert may be applied to all expert testimony, including scientific and 
nonscientific evidence). 
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of the dispute.68  Courts must analyze eDiscovery review methodologies to 
ensure the integrity of the discovery process for the underlying litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
As technology continues to advance, so will eDiscovery jurisprudence.  
The “gatekeeping” function mandated by the Supreme Court should no 
longer be relegated to Daubert challenges on the eve of trial.  As the 
“gatekeepers” of expert testimony,69 courts should analyze eDiscovery 
review methodologies—even during the discovery phase of litigation—to 
the extent that they will impact the validity of evidence at trial. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 102 states:  “These rules should be construed 
so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense 
and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of 
ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”70 
The stakes for litigants are too high for a finding not to be made by a 
court on the reliability of the technology at the heart of an eDiscovery 
dispute.  An analysis of the verification of the standard operating 
procedures used and technological modules calls for a “gatekeeping” 
function.  TAR—and other related issues subject to many eDiscovery 
challenges—if not properly analyzed, risks false and/or incomplete results 
that very well may compromise a litigant’s claims or defense at trial.  
Although eDiscovery review is pretrial, the “gatekeeping” function 
incumbent upon the judicial system to ensure a full and fair presentation of 
the best—and, most importantly, accurate—evidence transcends all phases 
of the litigation process. 
 
 
 68. See Global Aerospace Inc. v. Landow Aviation, L.P., No. CL 61040, 2012 WL 
1431215 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012) (“Order Approving the Use of Predictive Coding for 
Discovery”). 
 69. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147 (explaining that Rule 702 makes “no relevant 
distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge” 
and “makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony”). 
 70. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
